Ideas and Symbolic Technologies (Week 3 Post class blog)


The differences between Laffey and Weldes’ symbolic technologies and Goldstein and Keohane’s rationalist ideas on first analysis appeared nuanced and abstruse. The very name symbolic technologies made the entire piece seem esoteric in terminology. The discussion in class helped to strip away some of this phraseology and demonstrate a key difference that Laffey and Weldes assert in contrast to Goldstein and Keohane. 

Goldstein and Keohane point out that “a sophisticated realist … could agree that interests are always interpreted through psychological processes …” (pg 7). Thus, they introduce their own addition to an ideational approach to international relations. Ideas defined as beliefs are categorized neatly and intriguingly according to their effects on the holder.

They then continue with a seemingly logical three way in which these ideas can affect decision made by the original holder. In class, these three categories, world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs were debated for supremacy. I recalled during the debate how even Goldstein and Keohane deem these three categories interwoven. They even state that it may be impossible, and I would even argue pointless to detangle and analyze separately. These categories seem to run into one another and I questioned if each of these is a subcategory of the larger. For instance, are principle beliefs just a natural result after a world view has been established. Further, are causal beliefs then developed after principled beliefs are set.

Additionally, they claim that ideas can be considered symbolic technologies which provide representations of the world or, as defined in class, they help us make sense of the world. They are not commodities but are self-empowered by their representational nature. Laffey and Weldes climactically proclaim Goldstein and Keohane realists advancing a rationalist view in a new way.

While I enjoyed Goldstein and Keohane’s tidy analysis with clear categories and methodical language, I find Laffey and Weldes argument to be more valid, albeit more complex. Rationalism is a product of our ideas, our beliefs, our world views, our symbolic technologies or whatever you may define it as. Our self-interest is then also subject to these representations. Hence, we see international actors acting irrationally, but they are viewing their reality as presented by their collective ideas or symbolic technologies.  

Works Cited
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Keohane. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change." Cornell University Press.
Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. "Beyond Belief:." European Journal of International Relations3, no. 2 (1997).

Comments

  1. I like your point that while an actor may view themselves as rational, others may see things differently. Do you think a global sovereign in the style of Hobbes might help to reduce instances of similar miscommunication? Or foster an environment ripe for more?

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    Replies
    1. I think that a sovereign would squash any other opposing opinions and seek to create one version of rationality and reality. This would probably decrease the miscommunication, but is not very productive to society (North Korea). It would just stifle innovation.

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