Ideas and Symbolic Technologies (Week 3 Post class blog)
The differences between Laffey and Weldes’ symbolic
technologies and Goldstein and Keohane’s rationalist ideas on first analysis
appeared nuanced and abstruse. The very name symbolic technologies made the
entire piece seem esoteric in terminology. The discussion in class helped to
strip away some of this phraseology and demonstrate a key difference that
Laffey and Weldes assert in contrast to Goldstein and Keohane.
Goldstein and Keohane point out that “a sophisticated
realist … could agree that interests are always interpreted through
psychological processes …” (pg 7). Thus, they introduce their own addition to
an ideational approach to international relations. Ideas defined as beliefs are
categorized neatly and intriguingly according to their effects on the holder.
They then continue with a seemingly logical three way in
which these ideas can affect decision made by the original holder. In class,
these three categories, world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs
were debated for supremacy. I recalled during the debate how even Goldstein and
Keohane deem these three categories interwoven. They even state that it may be
impossible, and I would even argue pointless to detangle and analyze separately.
These categories seem to run into one another and I questioned if each of these
is a subcategory of the larger. For instance, are principle beliefs just a
natural result after a world view has been established. Further, are causal
beliefs then developed after principled beliefs are set.
Additionally, they claim that ideas can be considered
symbolic technologies which provide representations of the world or, as defined
in class, they help us make sense of the world. They are not commodities but are
self-empowered by their representational nature. Laffey and Weldes
climactically proclaim Goldstein and Keohane realists advancing a rationalist
view in a new way.
While I enjoyed Goldstein and Keohane’s tidy analysis with
clear categories and methodical language, I find Laffey and Weldes argument to
be more valid, albeit more complex. Rationalism is a product of our ideas, our
beliefs, our world views, our symbolic technologies or whatever you may define
it as. Our self-interest is then also subject to these representations. Hence,
we see international actors acting irrationally, but they are viewing their
reality as presented by their collective ideas or symbolic technologies.
Works Cited
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Keohane. "Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change." Cornell
University Press.
Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. "Beyond Belief:." European
Journal of International Relations3, no. 2 (1997).
I like your point that while an actor may view themselves as rational, others may see things differently. Do you think a global sovereign in the style of Hobbes might help to reduce instances of similar miscommunication? Or foster an environment ripe for more?
ReplyDeleteI think that a sovereign would squash any other opposing opinions and seek to create one version of rationality and reality. This would probably decrease the miscommunication, but is not very productive to society (North Korea). It would just stifle innovation.
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