Public Authority
The role of public
authority is abundantly clear when considering that of nations. There, the
government of choices flexes their authority so that taxes are paid, lawbreakers
are imprisoned, and in some cases, that the government itself undergoes
scheduled changes, like the US system of electing a new leader every four
years. In other situations, the origin, continued existence, and raison d’etre
for public authority is rather murkier.
I write, as
Phillip Williams has previously done much more eloquently, of ‘unofficial’
groups who wield their own version of public authority either as part of a
nation-state, or as their own, separate entity. Some of them are traditional,
in that we the residents of superpowers, have simply become accustomed to
seeing them scroll across our news channels; FARC, the Mafia, the Taliban. Others
are newer. The elephant in the room, ISIS, is arguably less than a decade old,
but its so imprinted on our collective social subconscious that is too is
headed for the category where you shrug and click to the next channel.
How did these
groups establish themselves so that we, in our American indifference, grant them
the courtesy of growing tired of their news? They have authority, granted to
them in a rather Hobbesian way. The people of the nations in which they operate;
Colombia, Italy, Afghanistan, Syria, for quick example, in part give them
legitimacy by taking part in their activities and following commands passed
down the chain. In a way, its just like obeying traffic laws or volunteering at
voting booths. It’s the use of violence that makes everything a bit trickier.
These
state-less groups sometimes act as mini-states, even collecting their own form
of taxes. Unfortunately for the residents of their controlled territories, they
care less about applying physical violence than the US does if you’re not
paying your taxes. Which brings us to a point made in class and in our weekly
readings. What happens if a group like ISIS gets ahold of a nuclear weapon. We’ve
mostly established that large countries with nuclear weapons, see India and
Pakistan, realize that they can’t afford a nuclear war, which sometimes simmers
conflicts down. I should briefly note that I do not advocate for the possession
of nuclear weapons as an anti-war-mongering technique. Terrorist groups like ISIS, who aren’t elected
and have already quashed most local opposition to their tactics or presence, do
not have the same moral qualms imposed on them by their population. Should they
obtain a nuclear weapon, or synthesize their own nuclear materials, what constrains
them from using it? They have much of the same authority as their ‘official’
state brethren, but none of the constraints that come with operating in an
international system with trade agreements and treaties and old friendships.
There is no real answer to this, at least that I have, but it is an important question
to ponder, moving forward into a career in the international sphere.
References
Phil Williams, “Transnational
Organized Crime and the State,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. Tom
Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (Cambridge, 2002).
I wonder what your opinion is on what the attainment of nuclear weapons would have TCOs such as ISIS or Al Qaeda. Do you think there is any chance that these weapons could actually help to stabilize these radical groups by giving them a seat at the table? Not saying I think this would work, but if we theorize that more nations should be able to acquire them, does that mean that the same stabilizing theory Waltz suggests could be true of truly powerful TCOs?
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