Why the Minutemen Will Stay on Alert
It is a fallacy to think that we could simply walk away from nuclear weapons given the history of our nation and the current state of world affairs. Blair makes a valid point in his assertion that de-alerting the nuclear powers could save us from accidental catastrophe, but I argue that given our history and our current nationalist climate, it would be folly to think that we could do so safely and without consequence. Waltz argued that nuclear weapons helps to maintain the peace between major powers, but would that peace be secured if other countries knew we couldn't strike back? While idealistic, de-alerting is not in our immediate agenda.
One of the first arguments Blair poses is the ability of terrorists to hack our weapons and use them against us or other nations. The notion that removing these weapons from their silos and subs will stop terrorists from doing ill deeds would hinge upon our ability so safely store and transport dangerous weapons. Gusterson points to multiple occasions where the US has accidentally dropped, mishandled and even lost weapons of mass destruction. Our track record isn't compelling either with recent incidents involving Navy ships colliding and air crafts going down during training simulations. Do we really think that exchanging missiles on open seas, or transporting warheads from silo to silo doesn't allow the same risk to hackers, insurgents or insiders as a red button that required top secret codes? Maybe the difference is an hour between the two situations, but this doesn't seem like a compelling reason to take our finger off the trigger.
The second portion of this equation is how de-alerting would start. Do we expect our comrade nations like Russia or China to simply step away from their weapons because we agree to do so? Syria was supposed to lose its chemical weapons based on multi-lateral agreements but it seems like children are still dying in the streets from strange gas attacks. It seems unfathomable that the same countries we are striking trade wars with would agree to simply get rid of their first-strike ability because we all decide to play nice. Blair offers the idea that if we simply walk away from our weapons first, other nations will follow. Waltz would argue that maybe our pole would simply walk away from its last line of defense. We shouldn't expect any other "good-willed" nation to act first either, so it seems like the process to de-alert hits an impermeable wall of stubborn sovereignty.
I don't think that nuclear weapons are a good thing for our world; it is horrific to think that weapons able to take out entire countries await a simple command and security check to activate. On the other hand, the same kind of marginalization the US uses to talk about "rogue countries" with nuclear weapons applies to the concept that now that everyone can have them, no one should. We feel some superiority to say that after having ruled for decades with our nuclear sidekicks in the wing, we've turned a new leaf when smaller nations start to realize the same power. It is idealistic and futile to think that de-alerting is possible because the greater good outweighs national interest. Blair makes a compelling argument for humanitarianism, but given the US's love hate (without the love) relationship with the world currently, who are we to be the moral light into the dark unknown?
Blair, Bruce. 2008. "Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons." International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament.
Gunterson, Hugh. 1999. "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination." Cultural Anthropology: 14 (1): 111-143.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary Hisotry: 18 (4): 615-628.
One of the first arguments Blair poses is the ability of terrorists to hack our weapons and use them against us or other nations. The notion that removing these weapons from their silos and subs will stop terrorists from doing ill deeds would hinge upon our ability so safely store and transport dangerous weapons. Gusterson points to multiple occasions where the US has accidentally dropped, mishandled and even lost weapons of mass destruction. Our track record isn't compelling either with recent incidents involving Navy ships colliding and air crafts going down during training simulations. Do we really think that exchanging missiles on open seas, or transporting warheads from silo to silo doesn't allow the same risk to hackers, insurgents or insiders as a red button that required top secret codes? Maybe the difference is an hour between the two situations, but this doesn't seem like a compelling reason to take our finger off the trigger.
The second portion of this equation is how de-alerting would start. Do we expect our comrade nations like Russia or China to simply step away from their weapons because we agree to do so? Syria was supposed to lose its chemical weapons based on multi-lateral agreements but it seems like children are still dying in the streets from strange gas attacks. It seems unfathomable that the same countries we are striking trade wars with would agree to simply get rid of their first-strike ability because we all decide to play nice. Blair offers the idea that if we simply walk away from our weapons first, other nations will follow. Waltz would argue that maybe our pole would simply walk away from its last line of defense. We shouldn't expect any other "good-willed" nation to act first either, so it seems like the process to de-alert hits an impermeable wall of stubborn sovereignty.
I don't think that nuclear weapons are a good thing for our world; it is horrific to think that weapons able to take out entire countries await a simple command and security check to activate. On the other hand, the same kind of marginalization the US uses to talk about "rogue countries" with nuclear weapons applies to the concept that now that everyone can have them, no one should. We feel some superiority to say that after having ruled for decades with our nuclear sidekicks in the wing, we've turned a new leaf when smaller nations start to realize the same power. It is idealistic and futile to think that de-alerting is possible because the greater good outweighs national interest. Blair makes a compelling argument for humanitarianism, but given the US's love hate (without the love) relationship with the world currently, who are we to be the moral light into the dark unknown?
Blair, Bruce. 2008. "Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons." International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament.
Gunterson, Hugh. 1999. "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination." Cultural Anthropology: 14 (1): 111-143.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary Hisotry: 18 (4): 615-628.
My perception of the world and how international actors engage with each other may come across as naive because I have a tendency to believe that the most ideal scenarios are achievable. For example, I don't think that countries the U.S. views as great threats (ie. China, Russia) fear us or hesitate to attack us because of our nuclear capabilities but rather things like economic factors and having many strong and reliable allies. I think de-alerting would signal other nuclear countries to shift their focus from security to other priorities which they would probably appreciate. However, I am less certain about those who are currently trying to conceive nuclear powers. But, even if a an actor got its hands on a nuclear weapon and tried to use it against the U.S., they would have to think about the severe consequences of their actions. More likely than not the U.S. will be prepared to prevent and defend itself without being “nuclear ready”. To conclude, I don’t think our nuclear arsenal is what is keeping us safe or will keep us safe in the event of an attack and I think de-alerting will prove more beneficial (ie. positive effects in relationships among states) than keeping our nuclear assemblages ready and on the go.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, I lean more toward the cantankerous than Alexandra. I agree that traditional 'state' actors are unlikely to deploy their nuclear arsenals, at least as things stand today, but I am very concerned by the possible loopholes left free for terrorist groups to exploit if we scatter our nuclear reserves still further.
ReplyDeleteI suppose I ascribe to Gunterson's idea that our vision of nuclear powers is very orientalist. I think a failing US economy promoting fear and visions of grandeur could propel a disheveled leader into launching weapons of mass destruction just as easily as any "unstable" country. If China decides to dump our X-trillion dollars worth of debt they are holding in bonds, would it be unfathomable to see our country strike back the only way possible? I don't think dropping our weapons will make much of a difference to other powerful countries. I can't see the good will in our world paying it forward when we are so divided as a nation, let alone completely different styles of thought.
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